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Abstract
Background: How do we recognize emotions from other people? One possibility is that our own emotional experiences
guide us in the online recognition of emotion in others. A distinct but related possibility is that emotion experience helps us
to learn how to recognize emotions in childhood.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We explored these ideas in a large sample of people (N=4,608) ranging from 5 to over 50
years old. Participants were asked to rate the intensity of emotional experience in their own lives, as well as to perform a
task of facial emotion recognition. Those who reported more intense experience of fear and happiness were significantly
more accurate (closer to prototypical) in recognizing facial expressions of fear and happiness, respectively, and intense
experience of fear was associated also with more accurate recognition of surprised and happy facial expressions. The
associations held across all age groups.
Conclusions: These results suggest that the intensity of one’s own emotional experience of fear and happiness correlates
with the ability to recognize these emotions in others, and demonstrate such an association as early as age 5.
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Introduction
Recognition of facial affect is critically important in guiding
social interactions, and humans are remarkably adept at
recognizing a wide range of emotional cues from the faces of
others. In spite of this general ability to recognize specific
emotional cues, there is considerable individual variability in the
recognition of facial affect. A number of clinical disorders,
including focal brain lesions, autism [1], antisocial personality
disorder [2], and mood disorders [3], are associated with altered
facial affect recognition, and current research efforts are aimed at
understanding why. Additionally, variables among the general
population such as sex [4], general intelligence, age [5], and state
variables such as mood [6] are known to influence facial
recognition performance.
Despite the importance of the topic, both from a basic research
and a clinical perspective, and despite the large number of ongoing
studies, the mechanisms behind emotion recognition remain
unclear. There is, however, no shortage of theories, all of which
are debated. One possibility is that one’s own ability to experience
emotions is used in the recognition of another’s facial expression,
either through actual simulation of another’s state [7] or through
formulating a more cognitive theory about how another person
feels and how they may behave [8]. A related possibility is that
emotion experience, or knowledge of it, are not necessarily on-line
for emotion recognition, but that emotion experience throughout
development contributes to the ability to recognize emotions in
others. Evidence for this experience-based learning of facial affect
recognition comes from developmental psychology and neuropsy-
chology. Children who have been abused show facilitated
recognition of anger expressions, perhaps due to increased
experience with negative emotion [9]. Paired deficits in both the
experience and recognition of emotion for fear following amygdala
damage [10,11] and disgust following damage to the basal ganglia
and/or the insula [12,13] suggest that the neural substrates of
emotion experience and recognition overlap, at least to some
extent.
Despite these multiple sources of evidence for an association
between the experience and recognition of emotion, it has been
difficult to find direct support for the relationship in the normal
population in general. If our own emotional experience influences
how we recognize emotion in others, then there should be a
reliable relationship between self-reported emotional experience,
on the one hand, and the recognition of emotion in others, on the
other hand. For instance, those individuals more sensitive to their
own emotional states might also be more attuned to the emotions
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contribute to one’s own emotional experience in real life, the effect
may be small and require large samples to detect it.
We carried out a large-scale initial study to probe these issues
further. We collected data from a large sample of participants
(N=4,608), and across several different age ranges. We examined
the possibility that those individuals who report having experi-
enced strong emotional experiences in real life will also be most
accurate in recognizing emotion in others. Here we define emotion
recognition accuracy as closely matching a facial expression of
emotion to a specified prototypical emotion expression, lying along
a continuum of expressions. We show that those people who have
experienced intense happiness are more accurate specifically in
recognizing facial expressions of happiness in others, and that
those who have experienced intense fear are more accurate in
recognizing facial expressions of fear, as well as to some extent
recognizing other emotions.
Results
We tested 4,608 participants spanning ages 5 through over 50 in
the context of a traveling exhibit installation of the California
Science Museum (Table 1). Two pieces of data were collected
from each participant: (1) their self-rated experience of emotion in
everyday life, and (2) their accuracy in judging the emotion of
morphed facial expressions, from moving a slider to dynamically
change the face image to correspond to a stated emotion label (see
Figure 1). Participants were divided into 4 groups on the basis of
their emotion experience: Very Weak, Medium, Strong, and Very
Strong. Inspection of the raw data distributions of slider placement
during the emotion recognition task by each of these four
emotional experience groups showed that every group had
unimodal distributions, with the modal response for every emotion
being the ‘accurate’ emotion prototype as defined by the
experimenter (with the exception of disgust; see comment in
Materials and Methods below). However, those groups with
weaker emotion experience had distributions that became
progressively more flat in both directions, with a substantially
higher proportion of responses further from the prototype (see
Figures S1 and S2 in Supporting Information).
Given the possibility of age and sex differences, we included these
factors in our analyses (see Table 1 for age group breakdown and
numberofparticipantsofeach sexineachgroup).For eachemotion
category, a 2 (Sex) 66 (Age Group: ages 5–10, 11–16, 17–20, 21–
30, 31–40, 41–50, Over 50)64 (Emotion Experience; Very Weak,
Medium, Strong, Very Strong) ANOVA was conducted, with the
absolute value of the distance from each prototypical emotion as the
dependentvariableasa measureofaccuracy.Wefounda significant
effect for fear and happiness: participants who reported experienc-
ing‘very strong’ fear orhappiness weremore likely to show accurate
facial recognition of fear and happiness, respectively, than those
who reported ‘very weak’ fear experiences (Fear: F(3,4552)=7.7,
p,0.0001, eta squared =0.005; Happy: F(3,4552)=4.5, p,0.01,
eta squared =0.003; see Figure 2). Post-hoc comparisons showed
that people who reported experiencing very weak fear rated fear
faces significantly less accurately than all the other emotion
experience groups (ps,0.0001, Bonferroni corrected). Further-
more, those who reported experiencing very strong happiness rated
happy faces significantly more accurately than all the other emotion
experience groups (ps,0.05, Bonferroni corrected). Anger experi-
ence showed a trend toward predicting anger recognition (Anger:
F(1,4552)=2.3, p=0.08, eta squared =0.002). Follow up contrasts
did not show significant differences among the anger recognition
groups, however (ps.0.15). Experience of surprise was not
significantly predictive of surprise recognition performance (Sur-
prise: F(1,4552)=1.5, p=0.2, eta squared ,0.0001).
There was a significant effect of age across all emotion
recognition categories, (F(6,4552).5.0, ps,0.0001, eta squared
.0.007; see Figure 3). Follow-up contrasts showed that this effect
was primarily due to the youngest age group (ages 5–10) showing
the least accurate facial affect recognition (ps,0.05 compared to all
other age groups, Bonferroni corrected; see Figure 3). Participants
in the ‘Very Weak’ experience groups across all age ranges showed
the poorest recognition performance of all emotion recognition
categories. There was, however, a significant Age 6 Emotion
Experience interaction for fear recognition (F(18,2552)=2.0,
p,0.01, eta squared =0.008) but none of the other emotion
recognition categories. This interaction may be due to the especially
poor and highly variable fear recognition of those reporting ‘Very
Weak’ fear experience across all age groups. The performance of
this group was highly variable, ranging from an average of 11.1 to
18.2 morphs away from the fear prototype across the various age
groups (see dashed line in Figure 3). These effects were not due to a
preponderance of the youngest participants in the ‘Weak Fear
Experience Group’, as these participants were distributed through-
out the fear experience groups (see Table S1 in the Supporting
Information). There were no significant Age by Emotion Experi-
ence interactions found for recognition of any of the other emotion
categories, further suggesting that the influence of emotional
experience on facial affect recognition holds across all age groups.
There were no significant effects of sex on affect recognition
performance, nor were there significant interactions between sex
and emotional experience. Females were more likely than males to
report ‘very strong’ experiences of all emotions tested: happiness
(64% vs. 56%), fear (38% vs. 28%), surprise (28% vs. 26%), and
anger(48%vs.46%).Becausetheeffectsofemotionalexperienceon
facial affect recognition were independent of sex, we have chosen to
omit further discussion of sex differences.
Given the strong effect of fear experience on fear recognition,
we also examined associations between the experience of fear and
recognition of the other facial emotions (happy, surprise, and
anger). People who reported stronger experience of fear showed
more accurate recognition of surprise (F(3,4552)=4.8, p,0.002,
eta squared =0.003) and happiness (F(3,4552)=2.7, p,0.05, eta
squared =0.002). Post-hoc comparisons showed that people who
reported experiencing very weak fear rated surprised and happy
faces significantly less accurately than those who reported
experiencing very strong fear (ps,0.05, Bonferroni corrected).
Fear experience was not a significant predictor of anger facial
expression accuracy (F(3,4552),1, p.0.7, eta squared ,0.0001).
Table 1. Frequency counts of female and male participants
within each age group.
Age Groups Female Male Totals
Age 5–10 548 420 968
Age 11–16 961 604 1565
Age 17–20 268 130 398
Age 21–30 330 193 523
Age 31–40 296 185 481
Age 41–50 255 198 453
Over 50 118 102 220
Totals 2776 1832 4608
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.t001
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Our study demonstrates for the first time that in the general
population emotional experience in real life is reliably associated
with the ability to recognize happiness and fear in others. Very
weak experiences of both these emotions were associated with less
accurate recognition of those particular emotions from the face.
Fear experience was further associated with more accurate
recognition of happiness and surprise. These findings support
the hypothesis that own emotional experience may play a role in
recognizing the emotions of other people, either through on-line
simulation or through effects during development.
There are several possible explanations for the effect we found.
Participants may have implicitly called on their own experience
with a particular emotion in order to choose which facial
configuration best matched their understanding of how a
particular emotion is expressed. Those individuals who reported
having a ‘very strong’ experience of fear, for example, may have
more ready access to their own facial configuration during a fear
experience and therefore more closely match the visual stimulus of
fear with the prototypical expression. Recent work has suggested
that one’s affective empathy may be a trait-like characteristic,
which interacts with the expressivity of others to influence
accuracy in labeling the affective expressions of others [14].
Another alternative is that the relationship between reported
emotional experience and emotional recognition may reflect the
affective beliefs of an individual, rather than the momentary
experience of emotion. Retrospective assessments of emotional
experience (as used in the current study) are thought to be an
index of an individual’s beliefs about their emotional states and
may not necessarily reflect actual experiences [15,16]. As such, it is
possible that those individuals reporting high experience of fear
Figure 1. Stimuli Used in the Study. Example screenshots of A) the facial affect recognition task and B) the emotional experience task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.g001
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beliefs about emotions and less in terms of actual emotional
experience. It is also possible that the reaction to others’
expressions is influenced by tempermental characteristics present
at birth. Temperament is known to influence the expression of
emotion [17]. The emotional reaction to another’s expression may
be determined by a combination of temperamental influences on
reactivity coupled with a more nuanced understanding of
expressions that develop through learning.
Another possible explanation for these findings is that those who
reported having ‘very weak’ emotional experiences may have a
different conception of what a fearful or happy face may look like.
In either case, stronger experience of emotion may influence an
individual toward a more ‘modal’ or prototypical understanding of
facial expressions of emotion, making the individual more likely to
accurately interpret the social cues of others. Without this
experience-enhanced recognition, an individual may not recognize
signals from another either as quickly or as accurately.
This idea that we recognize other people’s emotional expres-
sions through simulation of the emotion experience has a history in
philosophy and psychology with simulationist models of emotion
recognition [7]. These models argue that accurately recognizing
emotion from the faces of others may require the experience
(either concurrently or through past experience) of that particular
emotional state. Similarly, one common model of empathy
suggests that observing another’s emotional state activates
representations of that emotion in the observer [18]. These
representations then, may activate the bodily states associated with
that emotion merely by observing another’s expression. The
establishment of representations of these emotional states should
take place through experiential learning. Individuals often
experience intense emotion in the presence of others. Experience
in these social emotional settings may give observers experience
with how other people’s faces react in a frightening situation, for
example. In the absence of such experiences, that individual may
be less able to accurately recognize a given emotional expression
through a reduced ability to represent the experience of that
emotion. Results from our study are consistent with the hypothesis
that those individuals who have not had a strong experience of
either fear or happiness may be less able to represent those
particular emotions, and when required to match their own
representation of these emotions to facial expressions of these
stimuli, are less able to match them to prototypical expressions. A
final and simpler possibility is that those people who are more
sensitive to their own emotions would report more intense
emotional experiences, and would also be more accurate in their
recognition of emotion in others. At this stage, our finding clearly
demonstrates an association, but the causal relationship between
experience and recognition of emotions remains to be investigated
in detail.
The specificity of the association between emotional experience
and recognition for only fear and happiness deserves comment.
The experience of happiness was associated only with the
recognition of happiness, and the experience of fear was associated
primarily with recognition of fear, although also (at least
marginally) with the recognition of surprise and happiness. Such
Figure 2. Emotional Experience is Associated with Facial Affect
Recognition. Association between the intensity of emotion experi-
ence (x-axis) and recognition of facial affect (y-axis). Data show the
mean and 95% confidence intervals for the absolute value of the
distance from the prototypical expression for each experience group. A:
fear; B: happiness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.g002
Figure 3. Emotional Experience Effects are Consistent Across
Age Groups. Absolute value of the distance from the prototypical
expression for all emotions across age groups. Data show mean and
95% confidence intervals. Dashed line indicates the distance from the
prototypical expression of fear from those who report having
experienced ‘Very Weak’ fear in their lives.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.g003
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the simulated emotion is more precisely matched to the observed
emotion. The strong experience of fear may also lead to a
facilitation of the processing of ambiguous emotional signals from
others [19].
A final important issue is the development of facial affect
recognition throughout childhood and adolescence. Since we
included participants spread from age 5 through over 50 (Table 1),
our study was in a particularly good position to examine whether
there were any notable changes across these different ages. An
individual’s history of emotional experience may play a role in
determining his or her response to, and appreciation of, facial
affect. Extreme examples of this association come from psychiatric
disorders such as antisocial personality disorder [2] and depression
[3], which are both associated with impaired recognition of facial
affect, as well as from developmental disorders such as autism. But
pathological experiential effects do not always result in impaired
performance: children who have been physically abused are faster
at categorizing prototypical facial expressions of anger than are
typically developing children [9]. In addition to these influences of
mental disorders and physical abuse, other factors such as mood
within the normal range may influence the speed and accuracy in
recognition of an emotional expression within a healthy popula-
tion [6]. In our study, we found evidence for reduced affect
recognition accuracy among the youngest participants (aged 5–10)
for all emotions, but importantly the pattern of association
between experience and recognition was the same across age
groups. Importantly, the stimuli for participants of all ages were
the same adult face series, which may have influenced perfor-
mance among the younger groups of participants. Future work
should address this issue by examining facial affect recognition in a
wide age-range of participants and using facial stimuli from models
that vary in age. These findings indicate that although there is a
general age-related improvement in affect recognition, this pattern
stabilizes by middle childhood and the effects of emotional
experience are observed at the earliest age range tested.
Conclusion
In a large sample of museum-goers, we examined the
relationship between emotional experience and emotional recog-
nition. We demonstrate that people who reported experiencing
strong fear or happiness show more accurate (closer to
prototypical) recognition of expressions of these emotions,
respectively. Further, fearful experience was correlated with more
accurate facial affect recognition across the emotions of happiness
and surprise. Our results may provide a basis for individual
differences in emotion recognition, empathy, and other aspects of
social behavior.
Materials and Methods
Ethics
The procedures described in this manuscript conform to the
guidelines of the Institutional Review Board of Saint Louis
University. Informed consent was not obtained from participants
because the data were collected and analyzed anonymously.
Participants
Participants were visitors to Goosebumps!: The Science of Fear,a
traveling exhibit at the California Science Center in Los Angeles,
California, The Center of Science and Industry (COSI) in
Columbus, Ohio, and The Liberty Science Center in Jersey City,
New Jersey between June of 2007 and July of 2008. The exhibit,
developed by the California Science Center, was a hands-on
demonstration focusing on the biology, psychology, and sociology
of emotion, with an emphasis on fear. Data presented in the
current study were drawn from a computerized component
designed by R. Adolphs as part of the larger exhibit in which
visitors could choose freely to participate.
A total of 4992 participants fully completed the exhibits
described in this study. From this total, 384 participants (7%)
were excluded because their scores on at least one of the facial
affect recognition scales were .3 standard deviations from the
mean; this resulted in a final total of 4608 participants included in
all analyses (see Table 1 for demographic information). Partici-
pants were asked to provide their sex, race, and age (choices were
ages 5–10, 11–16, 17–20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, and over 50); no
identifying information was collected. The sample was ethnically
diverse, including Caucasians (62%), Latino/Hispanics (21%),
Asian Americans (11%), and African Americans (6%). Inclusion of
information about race and age are included to demonstrate the
diversity of the sample included in this analysis. As we had no a
priori hypotheses about these variables on facial affect recognition
or emotional experience, we do not present analyses examining
these variables.
Emotion Recognition Task
Figure 1A shows a screenshot of the Emotion Recognition Task.
Face stimuli were displayed on a monitor with the instructions
‘‘Make the face look angry [or one of the other emotions]. Drag
the slider until the face looks as angry [or one of the other
emotions] as it can.’’ A slider scale located under the face allowed
the participant to scroll through continuous morphs between
expressions in order to change the expression on the face to match
a given label. The stimuli consisted of 255 frames showing
prototypes and morphs of expressions from the Ekman and
Friesen series [20]. Participants were allowed to explore the full
range of facial expressions by sliding the slider bar through a fixed
sequence of neutral, happy, surprised, fearful, anger, disgust, and
sadness from left to the right side of the slider scale. Participants
failed to recognize disgust well, perhaps because the prototypical
expression of disgust does not map well onto the lay idea of this
concept [21]. There were a total of 36 intermediate morphing
steps between 2 frames of each prototypical facial expression. Each
participant was asked to match the emotions to labels using the
slider in a different, random order for the emotions happy,
surprised, fear, anger, and disgust. So, for example, when a subject
was asked to ‘‘make the face look happy’’, he/she was required to
move the slider scale until he or she decided that the face matched
his or her conception of what a happy face should look like.
Contrary to the typical emotion morphing tasks, which include a
separate morph series for each emotion ranging from neutral at
one end and the target emotion on the other end, our task
included all emotions along the same continuum.
We chose the order of our morphing continuum based on prior
studies showing that expressions are ranked in this order in terms
of their perceived similarity [11,22]. We used this task for two
reasons: first, it is more interesting for the subject to perform than
the standard task of matching a given facial expression to an
emotion label or rating it; second, we felt that the fine-grained
nature of the emotion morphs together with the interactive aspect
of scrolling through them would yield a more accurate and
unbiased match between the emotion label and expression.
Scoring. Performances on this task were scored as the
absolute value of the difference of each participant’s slider
placement from the prototypical facial expression (given in the
number of morph steps from the prototype corresponding to the
label to be matched).
Feeling & Recognizing Emotion
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Figure 1B shows a screenshot from the Emotional Experience
task. After completing the facial affect recognition task, partici-
pants were given the following instructions: ‘‘Think about your
past emotional experiences. Touch the box to the right of each
emotion that best describes how strongly you’ve felt it.’’ The
emotions were fear, happy, surprise, and angry. The boxes were
labeled: Very Weak, Medium, Strong, and Very Strong. We
examined the association between the emotions assessed in both
the recognition task and the experience questions: fear, happiness,
surprise, and anger.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Fear Experience Shapes Facial Fear Recognition.
Histograms depicting the distributions of distance from fear face
prototype separated by reported fear experience. X-axes represent
distance from fear face prototype (prototype located at 0 on x-
axis). Y-axes represent the number of participants from each group
who chose a particular face morph when asked to ‘‘make the face
look fearful.’’
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.s001 (0.17 MB TIF)
Figure S2 Distributions of Facial Affect Recognition. Histo-
grams depicting the distributions of the raw slider placements for
A: happy, B: surprise, C: fear, and D: anger. X-axes represent the
numerical location of the slider placement relative to the prototype
for each expression. Y-axes represent the number of participants
across the whole sample who chose a particular face morph.
Arrows on each x-axis denote the location of the prototypical facial
expression for each emotion.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.s002 (0.48 MB TIF)
Table S1 Age Distribution Across Fear Experience Groups. The
table shows the age distributions of the different fear experience
groups (numbers indicate the number of participants within each
age group who were in each fear experience group).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010640.s003 (0.03 MB
DOC)
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